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The Economic Progress 
of Immigrants 
George J. Borjas 
1.1  Introduction 
The economic impact of immigration depends both on how immigrants 
perform in the United States when they first enter the country, as well as 
on their long-run economic prospects. Beginning with Chiswick's (1978) 
pioneering work, this dual concern has guided much of the empirical re- 
search in  the  economics  of  immigration.'  The literature has  typically 
found that immigrants earn less than natives at the time of entry (with the 
entry wage disadvantage being larger for more recent cohorts), and that 
the wage gap between immigrants and natives narrows over time as immi- 
grants assimilate into U.S. society. Many studies conclude that the rate of 
wage convergence between immigrants and natives is not very large, so 
that the most recent immigrant waves will probably suffer from a substan- 
tial wage disadvantage for much of their working lives. 
The literature also stresses that there are sizable differences in economic 
performance among national origin groups (Borjas 1987; LaLonde and 
Topel 1992; and Funkhouser and Trejo 1995). For the most part, these 
studies have examined the impact of national origin on the wage level of 
immigrants in the United  States, and the data suggest that immigrants 
who originate in developed countries earn more than immigrants  who 
originate in poorer countries. The sizable wage differentials among na- 
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tional origin groups combined with the changing national origin mix of 
the immigrant population in the United States has been the crucial factor 
in generating the trends in cohort “quality” that have been the subject of 
intense interest, both in academic studies and in the policy debate. 
It turns out that there are also sizable differences in the rate of wage 
growth experienced by the different national origin groups in the United 
States (Borjas 1995; Duleep and Regets 1997a, 1997b; Schoeni, McCarthy, 
and Vernez 1996; and Yuengert  1994). Therefore, it is important to deter- 
mine if the rate of wage convergence exhibits cohort effects: Do the most 
recent immigrant cohorts experience either faster or slower wage growth 
than earlier cohorts? The existing evidence, however, does not settle this 
issue  conclusively. Duleep  and Regets  (1997b)  argue  that  more  recent 
waves, who have lower entry wages, will experience faster wage growth in 
the future, while Borjas (1995) and Schoeni, McCarthy, and Vernez (1996) 
do not find any evidence of cohort effects in the rate of wage growth. 
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical study of the rate of eco- 
nomic progress experienced by immigrants. The study uses a human capi- 
tal framework to motivate and guide the analysis. There seems to be some 
confusion about whether human capital theory implies wage convergence 
among the various immigrant groups, in the sense that immigrants who 
have high wages at the time of entry should experience slower subsequent 
wage growth. I show that a reasonable set of assumptions can easily gener- 
ate investment  behavior in the immigrant population that leads to wage 
divergence among groups, with the most skilled groups earning more at 
the time of entry and experiencing faster wage growth. 
The empirical analysis uses the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Public Use Micro- 
data Samples (PUMS) of the decennial census. The empirical analysis of 
wage convergence in the immigrant population has much in common with 
the literature that estimates cross-country regressions to determine if there 
is convergence in per capita income across countries (Barro 1991, 1997; 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; Quah 1993). These studies typically find 
that the “raw” correlation between the growth rate in per capita GDP and 
the initial level of per capita GDP is positive, but weak. There is, however, 
a strong negative correlation between growth rates and initial levels of per 
capita income when the regression controls for measures of the country’s 
human capital endowment. The data, therefore, reveal conditional conver- 
gence in per capita income, in the sense that countries that start out with 
the same human capital endowments will tend to have the same per capita 
income levels in the long run. 
The differentiation between convergence and conditional convergence 
is  extremely useful  for  understanding  the economic  progress  of  immi- 
grants. As in the cross-country studies in the economic growth literature, 
the raw data reveal a positive correlation between the log entry wage of 
immigrants  and the subsequent  rate of wage growth. Furthermore,  the 
same source country characteristics that lead to high entry wages tend to The Economic Progress of Immigrants  17 
lead to faster wage growth. This positive correlation between entry wages 
and wage growth, however, turns negative when one compares immigrant 
groups who start out with similar human capital endowments. The empiri- 
cal evidence, therefore, indicates that even though immigrant groups with 
the same level of human capital will have similar earnings over the long 
haul, the sizable wage differentials observed among the various immigrant 
groups at the time of entry may well diverge over time. 
1.2  Conceptual Framework 
What is the relationship between entry wage levels and the rate of eco- 
nomic progress experienced by immigrants? This question is of more than 
passing interest because the entry wages of immigrant cohorts (relative to 
natives) have fallen dramatically in recent decades. Borjas (1995) reports 
that the immigrants who entered the United States between 1965 and 1969 
earned about 18 percent less than natives in 1970, while the immigrants 
who entered between 1985 and 1989 earned 38 percent less than natives 
in 1990.’ 
If the lower entry wages of more recent cohorts were compensated by a 
sufficiently higher rate of future wage growth, the present value of the 
(relative) earnings profiles of immigrants might not be as different as the 
differences in entry wage levels would suggest. In fact, the direction of the 
“quality” differential between immigrants and natives could be the oppo- 
site of that implied by  the trend in entry wages. However, if more recent 
cohorts have a lower rate of wage growth than earlier cohorts, the long-run 
implications of the decline in entry wages are amplified. It is important, 
therefore, to isolate the factors that determine the rate of wage growth of 
immigrant cohorts, and to determine the trends in the rate of economic 
progress across successive cohorts. 
Beginning with Chiswick (1978), practically all studies of the economic 
progress of immigrants use the human capital model as a point of depar- 
t~re.~  The typical discussion argues that immigrants have a relative wage 
disadvantage  at the  time  of  entry  because  immigrants  lack  the  U.S.- 
specific skills that are rewarded in the labor market. Moreover, the costs of 
acquiring human capital in the post migration period (such as becoming 
proficient in  English) are mainly incurred as forgone earnings, so that 
these initial human capital investments further depress entry wages for 
immigrants. Over time, as the immigrants reduce their human capital ac- 
quisitions and collect the returns on earlier investments, they experience 
faster wage growth than natives. 
This generic restatement of the human capital model seems to suggest 
2. These statistics actually refer to log point differentials. The convention of approximating 
3. Ben-Porath (1967) gives the classic presentation of the life-cycle human capital accumu- 
log point differentials by percentage differences will be used throughout most of the paper. 
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that one should expect a negative correlation between entry wages and 
subsequent wage growth: Faster wage growth results only if  immigrants 
are willing to give up some earnings at the time of entry. This inference, 
however, is incorrect because it does not account for the dispersion in the 
human capital stock that exists in the immigrant population at the time of 
entry.4 This heterogeneity could easily lead to a positive  correlation  be- 
tween entry wages and wage growth. A simple two-period model of the 
human capital accumulation process captures the basic idea. 
Let K measure the number  of efficiency units that an immigrant has 
acquired in the source country. Because human capital is not perfectly 
transferable across countries, a fraction 6 of these efficiency units evapo- 
rate when the immigrant enters the United States. The number of effective 
efficiency units that the immigrant can rent out in the U.S. labor market 
is then given by  E = (1 -  6)K. Without loss of generality, suppose that 
the market-determined rental rate for an efficiency unit is one dollar. 
An immigrant lives for two periods after arriving in the United States- 
the investment period and the payoff period. During the investment pe- 
riod, the immigrant devotes a fraction s of his efficiency units (or of his 
productive time) to the production of additional human capital. This allo- 
cation of effort might be worthwhile because it increases the number of 
efficiency units available in the payoff period by  g  X  100 percent. The 
present value of the immigrant’s income stream in the United States equals 
(1)  v = (1 - 6)K(1 - s) +  p[(l - 6)K(1 +  g)], 
where p is the discounting factor. It is instructive to think of p not only 
as a function of the immigrant’s discount rate but also as measuring the 
probability that the immigrant will stay in the United States (and hence 
collect the returns on the part of the investments that are U.S.-specific). 
The parameter  p,  therefore, is smaller when the immigrant has either a 
high discount rate or a high probability of out-migration. 
The human capital production function is: 
(2)  gE  = (,SE)~EP, 
where CL <  1 because of diminishing marginal productivity to human capi- 
tal investments. Beginning with Ben-Porath (1 967), the value of  the pa- 
rameter  p has been a matter of debate in the human capital literature. 
Highly skilled immigrants may be more adept at acquiring additional hu- 
man capital. This complementarity between pre-existing human capital 
and the skills acquired in the postmigration period would suggest that p 
is positive. Because the costs of human capital investments are mostly 
forgone earnings, however, it may be that highly skilled workers find it 
4. Many studies in the human capital literature attempt to estimate the correlation between 
initial earnings and wage growth. See, e.g., Hause (1980),  Kearl (1988),  and Neumark and 
Taubman (1 995). The Economic Progress of Immigrants  19 
very expensive to augment their human capital stock. This “substitutabil- 
ity” would then suggest that p is negative. 
The Ben-Porath specification of the human capital production function 
assumes “neutrality,” so that the two effects cancel each other and p is 
zero.5  Holding p constant, the neutrality assumption states that all workers 
invest the same dollar amount in human capital, regardless of their initial 
endowment. All workers then get the same dollar increase in earnings in 
the payoff period. As a result, the dollar age-earnings profiles of different 
workers are parallel to each other. The neutrality assumption also implies 
that the log age-earnings profiles of different workers must converge be- 
cause the payoff from human capital investment is relatively smaller for 
more-skilled workers.6 
Most of the empirical work in the human capital literature focuses on 
the life-cycle trends in log earnings, and analyzes the determinants of the 
rate of growth of earnings (rather than of the absolute change in earnings). 
It is, therefore, analytically convenient to define a different type of neutral- 
ity in the production function. In particular, rewrite equation (2) as: 
g  =  So‘Ea+P-l*  (3) 
Equation (3) relates the percentage increase in the human capital stock to 
the fraction of efficiency units that are used for investment purposes dur- 
ing the investment period.  Define relative neutrality to occur when  the 
relative increase in the human capital stock (g)  depends only on the frac- 
tion of time devoted to investment (s),  and not on the initial level of effec- 
tive capital. Relative neutrality then occurs when a + p = 1. If ci + p > 1, 
the relative returns from the investment (for a given time input) depend 
positively on the initial level of effective capital, and there is relative com- 
plementarity. Conversely, if a + p < 1, the relative returns from the invest- 
ment are negatively related to the level of initial capital, and there is relu- 
tive substitutability. Not surprisingly, the sign of (a  + p -  1) plays a crucial 
role in determining the relationship between the log entry wage of immi- 
grants and the subsequent rate of wage growth. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the model, it is worth noting that 
relative  neutrality  implies human capital complementarity in the Ben- 
Porath sense. After all, if the log age-earnings profiles are parallel across 
different workers, more-skilled workers must be investing more in human 
capital. An empirical finding of relative neutrality or relative complemen- 
tarity, therefore, would necessarily imply “Ben-Porath complementarity” 
in the production of human capital. 
Workers choose the rate of human capital investment (s) that maximizes 
5. In later work, Ben-Porath (1970) rejected some of the implications of the neutrality 
assumption. Rosen (1976) presents a model of human capital accumulation that does not 
rely on the neutrality assumption. 
6. Mincer (1974, ch. 4) provides a detailed discussion of the implications of human capital 
theory for the convergence of dollar and log age-earnings profiles. 20  George J. Borjas 
the present value of earnings. The first-order condition to the maximiza- 
tion problem implies that: 
=  (ap)l/(l-ml  E(m+p-l)/(l-a)  (4) 
Equation (4)  shows that the rate of human capital investment is positively 
related  to the discounting  factor, and that  the relationship  between the 
rate of human capital investment and initial human capital depends on 
the sign of a + p -  1. Suppose that all workers have the same discounting 
factor p. Relative neutrality then implies that all persons allocate the same 
fraction of time to the production of human capital. Highly skilled work- 
ers invest more if there is relative complementarity (a  + p > 1) and invest 
less if there is relative substitutability (a + p < 1). 
Of course, we  seldom have data on the fraction  of time that workers 
allocate to human capital investments. However, we do observe the earn- 
ings histories of workers. Let A be the relative wage growth experienced 
by an immigrant over his postmigration life cycle: 
It is easy to show that 
(6) 
Holding constant  the immigrant's  initial endowment  of human capital, 
the theory implies that immigrants with a higher p (and hence lower dis- 
count  rates  or  probabilities  of  out-migration)  experience  faster  wage 
growth. The relationship between the rate of wage growth and the initial 
level of effective human capital, however, is more complicated: 
(7) 
=(a+  p- 1)  (1  +  aP)s 
ap(1 - a)E'  dE  P 
The correlation between the rate of wage growth and initial human capital 
depends on the sign of a + p - 1. If there is relative complementarity in 
the  human  capital  production  function,  relative  wage  growth  will  be 
higher for immigrants who have higher levels of effective human capital. In 
contrast, if there is relative substitutability-and  higher levels of effective 
human capital make it costly to acquire additional human capital-the 
most-skilled immigrants experience less relative wage growth. 
The model can be used to determine the correlation between log entry 
wages and the rate of wage growth. The log entry wage of the immigrant is 
(8)  logw,,  =  logE +  lOg(l - s). The Economic Progress of Immigrants  21 
It is instructive to begin the discussion of the relationship between log w,, 
and A by considering the simpler case where the only exogenous variation 
in the immigrant population is in the discounting factor p. One can show 
that 
A higher discounting factor, therefore, reduces the log entry wage while 
raising the relative rate of wage growth. Equations (6) and (9) replicate the 
conceptual experiment where initial earnings vary among workers who 
have the same initial human capital. This experiment is the basis for many 
of the discussions of the human capital model. Human capital investment 
steepens the age-earnings profile by  reducing entry wages, raising future 
wages, and effectively generating a negative correlation  between the log 
entry wage and the rate of wage growth. 
However, this negative correlation can potentially break down when the 
entry wage is lower because the effective level of human capital is itself 
lower. In particular, 
The positive sign of the first term inside the brackets  of equation (10) 
indicates that the larger level of effective human capital raises entry wages 
simply because the additional skills are valued by  American employers. 
At the same time, the larger human capital endowment alters the rate of 
human capital investment. Define K* as 
By definition, the log entry wage is independent of the initial endowment 
of human capital when a + p - 1 = K*. Figure  1.1 illustrates the four 
cases that summarize the potential relationship between log entry wages 
and the rate of wage growth of immigrants: 
1. Relative substitution  between pre- and postmigration  human  capital 
(a + p < I).  Immigrants endowed with a substantial level of effective 
human  capital find it  expensive to augment their  stock  in  the United 
States. There is then a negative correlation between log entry wages and 
the rate of wage growth. Skilled immigrants invest less, earn more at the 
time of entry, and have a smaller rate of wage growth. 
2.  Relative neutrality in the human capitalproduction function (a  +-  p = 
I).  All workers have the same rate of investment (s).  The correlation be- 
tween the log entry wage and the rate of wage growth is zero. 22  George J. Borjas 
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Fig. 1.1  Theoretical relationship between entry wages, wage growth, and effective 
human capital 
3.  Weak relative complementarity in human capital  (0 < a  $.  /3  - 1 
<  K*).  Skilled immigrants then invest more in human capital, have higher 
entry wages,  and also have a higher rate of wage growth. There is, there- 
fore, a positive correlation  between the log entry wage  and the rate of 
wage growth. 
4.  Strong relative complementarity in human capital (0 < K*  < a!  +-  p 
-  1). Skilled immigrants invest so much in human capital that they actu- 
ally earn less at the time of entry, but experience faster wage growth. There The Economic Progress of Immigrants  23 
is again a negative correlation between the log entry wage and the rate of 
wage growth.’ 
The potential relationships between the log entry wage and the rate of 
wage growth are illustrated in figure 1.1. These cases can be used to con- 
struct simple empirical tests that might distinguish among the various pos- 
sibilities and provide valuable information about the human capital pro- 
duction function faced by immigrants. For example, suppose that there is 
weak relative complementarity in the production function. The variables 
that increase the immigrant’s effective human capital at the time of entry 
would then have the same qualitative effect on the log entry wage and on 
the rate of wage growth. In contrast, if  there were relative substitution, 
then variables that increase effective human capital would have a positive 
impact on the log entry wage but a negative impact on the rate of wage 
growth. The empirical analysis presented  below suggests that the data is 
best summarized by a “weak” positive correlation between log entry wages 
and the rate of wage growth. Put differently, immigrants with high levels 
of effective human capital experience both higher entry wages and faster 
economic progress in the United States. This finding suggests that the im- 
migrant human capital production function exhibits weak relative comple- 
mentarity.8 
1.3  Data and Basic Trends 
The study uses data drawn from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 PUMS. A 
person is classified as an immigrant if  he or she was born in a foreign 
country; all other workers are classified as natives9 I drew a  1 percent 
random sample from the native population  in each of the census years. 
The immigrant extract comprises a 2 percent random sample in 1970 and 
a 5 percent random sample in both 1980 and 1990,’O In each census year, 
7. Note that cases 1 and 4 both imply a negative correlation between the log entry wage 
and the rate of wage growth, but for different reasons. In the case of relative substitutability, 
the skilled workers earn more at the time of entry and have slower wage growth, while in the 
case of strong relative complementarity, the skilled workers earn less at the time of entry and 
have faster wage growth. It is also possible that a + p -  1 = K*. In this case, skilled immi- 
grants invest more, but the log entry wage is independent of the level of effective human 
capital. 
8. Although the theoretical framework provides a useful way for thinking about how heter- 
ogeneity in the immigrant population generates differences in the short-run and long-run 
economic performance of immigrant cohorts, the model ignored the link between the migra- 
tion decision and postmigration human capital investments. A more general analysis would 
explore how the characteristics  of the human  capital production  function might alter the 
process that selects the immigrant flow. 
9. This definition implies that persons born abroad of American parents and persons born 
in a U.S. possession are classified as natives. 
10. Unlike the earlier census data sets, the  1990 PUMS does not comprise a random 
sample. All calculations in the 1990 data use the sampling weights. 24  George J. Borjas 
the study is restricted to men aged 25-64  who work in the civilian sector, 
are not self-employed, and do not reside in group quarters. 
Consider the cohort of immigrants who migrated from country  i,  in 
calendar yearj, when they were k years old. To calculate the wage for 
each of the cohorts in the analysis, consider the following individual-level 
regression model: 
(1 2)  bDJc,,(t) =  X!,k(t)P(t) +  Y,&)  +  E,,k(t)? 
where w,(t)  is the hourly wage of cohort (i, j,  k)  in calendar year t;  Xis a 
vector of socioeconomic characteristics (discussed below); v,,(t)  is a fixed 
effect giving the “adjusted” wage of a person who belongs to the cohort; 
and E&)  is the stochastic error, assumed to be independent from all other 
variables in the model. The regression model in equation (12) is estimated 
separately in each census year. To simplify the notation, I denote the ad- 
justed wage of the comparable group of  native workers by  vn,(t).”  Con- 
sider initially the model where the standardizing vector Xdoes not contain 
any variables. The vector of fixed effects in the immigrant population then 
gives the average log wage in each country-of-origidyear-of-migration/ 
age-at-arrival cell, while the fixed effect in the native population gives the 
average log wage of natives in a particular age group. For example, v,(t) 
may give the average 1970 log wage for Mexican immigrants who arrived 
between 1965 and 1969 and who were 25-34  years old as of  1970. The 
respective fixed effect vno,(t) in the native population then gives the average 
1970 log wage for natives who were 25-34  years old as of 1970. 
Suppose we estimate the cross-section regression model in two different 
calendar years, say t and t’.  We can use the estimated fixed effects to calcu- 
late the rate of wage growth of immigrants over the calendar-time interval 
(t,  t‘)  as 
(13)  AVi,k(t’t’)  = b&’)  - V,,k(t)l. 
We  can also estimate the rate of wage growth of immigrants relative to 
that of comparable natives as 
(14)  Aq,k(LJ’)  =  [Y,k(f’) - Y,k(t)l - [v,,,(t’> - vnok(t>l. 
If the vector Xdoes not contain any standardizing variables, equation (1 3) 
defines the mean rate of wage growth for cohort  (i, j,  k), and equation 
(14) defines the cohort’s rate of wage growth relative to that observed in a 
comparably aged group of natives. 
I restrict the study to the immigrant cohorts who arrived between 1960 
1  I. I obtained the adjusted native wage by  simply adding the sample of native workers to 
the regression in equation (12) and including a vector of dummy variables indicating if the 
person in a particular age group (k)  is native born. The Economic Progress of Immigrants  25 
and  1979. The census data define four year-of-migration cohorts within 
this period: immigrants who arrived in 1960-64,  1965-69,  1970-74,  and 
1975-79.  The immigrant cohorts will also be defined in terms of four age 
groups, where the age of the immigrant is observed at the time the census 
is taken: immigrants who are 25-34,35-44,45-54,  and 55-64  years old. 
It is useful to begin by summarizing the broad trends in the rate of wage 
growth in the immigrant population  over the  1970-90  period. The first 
three columns of table 1.1 report the wage of immigrants-relative  to that 
of  comparably aged natives-for  each  of  the  year-of-migrationlage-at- 
arrival cohorts (aggregated over all national origin groups). Consider the 
immigrants who arrived in the United States between 1965 and 1969 and 
were 25-34  years old at the time of the 1970 census enumeration. These 
immigrants earned 13 percent less than natives who were 25-34  years old 
in 1970. By  1980, the wage gap between the two groups (who were 10 years 
older) had narrowed to 6 percent, and by  1990 (when the two groups were 
20 years older) to 3 percent. The last two columns of the table report the 
rate of wage  convergence implied by  these wage  data (AFqk(t, t‘)). This 
particular cohort experienced a rate of wage convergence of 7 percentage 
points in the first 10 years after arrival, and of another 4 percentage points 
in the second 10 years.12 
The remaining rows of the table reveal roughly the same rate of relative 
economic progress for many of the cohorts: about 10 percentage points 
over a 20-year period, with most of the wage convergence taking place in 
the first 10 years after arrival. Consider, for example, the experience of the 
group of young men who migrated in the late 1970s. Their relative wage 
increased by  7 percentage points between 1980 and 1990-the  same rate 
of relative wage growth experienced by  the young men who entered be- 
tween 1965 and 1969 during their first 10 years in the country. The data in 
table 1.1, therefore, do not provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that, 
on aggregate, there are cohort effects in the rate of wage convergence.I3 
12. A potential problem with interpreting  the relative wage growth of immigrants as a 
measure of economic progress is that there were historic changes in the U.S. wage structure 
during the  1980s, and these changes did not affect all skill groups equally (Murphy and 
Welch 1992; Katz and Murphy 1992). To control for the changes in the wage structure, La- 
Londe and Tope1 (1992) and Borjas (1995) propose “deflating” immigrant wages by measures 
of the wage change experienced within particular skill groups in the native population. I 
replicated the analysis presented in ths  paper using “real” wages that had been deflated by 
the wage growth experienced by  particular age-education groups in the native population. 
None of the results are affected by this adjustment of the data. 
13. The intercensal “tracking” reported in table 1.1 may lead to a biased picture of immi- 
grant economic progress if there is substantial nonrandom out-migration in the immigrant 
population (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996). Because the sample composition of “stayers” (i.e., 
persons who remain in the United States) is likely to change over time, the rates of wage 
convergence reported in the table might reflect both the economic progress of immigrants 
and the selection bias created by  out-migration. Unfortunately, the United States does not 
collect systematic data on the number or skill composition of the immigrants (and natives) 
who leave the country. 26  George J. Borjas 
Table 1.1  Relative Wages and Wage Growth for Immigrant Cohorts 
Rate of Wage 
Year of  Relative Wage  Convergence 
Migration/ 
Age at Arrival  1970  1980  1990  1970-80  1980-90 
1960-64  Arrivals 
15-24  in 1970 
25-34  in 1970 
3S44 in 1970 
45-54  in 1970 
1965-69 Arrivals 
15-24 in  1970 
25-34 in 1970 
3-4  in  1970 
45-54  in  1970 
1970-74  Arrivals 
25-34 in 1980 
3544  in  1980 
45-54  in 1980 
1975-79 Arrivals 
25-34  in  1980 
3-4  in  1980 










































-  ,2365 
-  .2400 
(.0051) 




,0409  - 
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(.0099) 
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-  .0039 
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-  ,0255  ,0663 
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(.0084) 
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Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
As noted earlier, one can think of the data reported in table 1.1 as being 
calculated from the model in equations (12)-(14)  where there are no stand- 
ardizing variables in the vector X.  It is of interest to determine the sensitiv- 
ity of the rate of wage growth in the immigrant population (relative to that 
of natives) to differences in human capital across the groups, particularly 
educational attainment. I estimated the regression model in equation (12) 
including a vector of dummy variables indicating the worker’s educational 
attainment. The dummy variables indicate if  the worker has less than 9 
years of schooling; 9-1  1 years; 12 years; 13-1 5 years; or 16 years or more. The Economic Progress of Immigrants  27 
The fixed effects vqk were then computed at the mean level of educational 
attainment for the entire immigrant sample. 
Table  1.2 reports the education-adjusted log wage levels and rate  of 
wage growth (relative to natives). Not surprisingly, the wage gap between 
immigrants  and natives falls when  we  control for differences in  educa- 
tional attainment between the two groups. For example, the entry wage of 
the immigrants who migrated in 1970-74  and were 35-44  years old in 1980 
is 20 percent lower than that of natives in the same age group, but it is 
Table 1.2  Relative Wages and Wage Growth for Immigrant Cohorts, Adjusted 
for Education 
Rate of Wage 
Year of  Relative Wage  Convergence 
Migration/ 
Age at Arrival  1970  1980  1990  1970-80  1980-90 
1960-64  Arrivals 
15-24  in 1970 
25-34  in 1970 
35-44 in 1970 
4554 in 1970 
196569 Arrivals 
15-24  in 1970 
2534 in 1970 
3H4  in 1970 
4554  in 1970 
1970-74  Arrivals 
25-34  in 1980 
35-44 in 1980 
4554 in 1980 
197579  Arrivals 
2534 in 1980 
354.4 in 1980 
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,0830  - 
(.0093) 
,0507  -  ,0254 
(.0084)  (.0137) 
,0535  -  ,0088 
(.0118)  (.0164) 
~  ,0133 
(.0236) 
,0570  __ 
,0200  .09  12 
-.0148  ,051  1 
(.0117)  (.0159) 
-  ,0245 
(.0236) 
(.0076) 
(.0077)  (.0120) 
,0258  ~ 
(.0061) 
-  ,0890 
-.I201  - 
~ 
(.OOSO) 
(.O 1  36) 
-  .0654 
-.I863  - 
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Table 1.3  Rate of Wage Convergence, by Country of Origin 
Arrived in 1965-69; 
Was 25-34  Years 
Old at Arrival: 
Arrived in 1975-79; 
Was 25-34  Years 
Old at Arrival: 









































































only  15 percent lower than that of  natives who have the same age and 
educational attainment. The data also suggests that there is faster wage 
convergence between immigrants and natives if we  adjust for differences 
in educational attainment. The relative rate of wage growth for the immi- 
grants who arrived in the late 1960s and were 25-34  years old in 1970 was 
7 percentage points in the first 10 years, and an additional 4 percentage 
points in the second 10 years. The education-adjusted rate of wage growth 
was 9 percentage points in the first  10 years, and another 5 percentage 
points in the second 10 years. 
Not surprisingly, there exist significant differences in economic progress 
across the various national origin groups. Table 1.3 illustrates this varia- 
tion by  reporting the unadjusted  and education-adjusted rates of  wage 
growth for selected national origin groups (relative to natives). Some of 
the groups exhibit very high rates of wage growth, while other groups do 
not exhibit any economic improvement. Consider, for example, the British 
immigrants who entered the United States in the late 1960s and were 25-34 
years old in 1970. Their relative wage rose by  15 percentage points in the 
first 10 years after arrival, and by an additional 7 percentage points in the 
second 10 years. In contrast, the relative wage of the comparable group of 
immigrants  from  the  Dominican  Republic  rose  by  only  2 percentage The Economic Progress of Immigrants  29 
points in the first 10 years, and by another 3 percentage points in the sec- 
ond 10 years. 
1.4  Wage Convergence 
The raw data reveal substantial dispersion in the rate of wage conver- 
gence experienced by immigrants originating in different countries, arriv- 
ing at different times and at different ages. The remainder of the empirical 
analysis attempts to understand the source of these differences. 
The  dependent variable in  this  section is  vqk(t, t‘), the rate  of  wage 
growth experienced by a particular immigrant cohort (from country i,  ar- 
riving in yearj, and at age k) over the intercensal  10-year period. The 
“cross-country” analysis is initially restricted to a sample that contains 
85 countries (listed in the appendix), four age groups, and four year-of- 
migration cohorts. The analysis “stacks” the data. The 85 countries used 
in the study are chosen because immigrants born in these countries can 
be  matched  across two  successive censuses,  and  these countries  have 
sufficiently large numbers of observations in the 1970, 1980, and 1990 cen- 
suses to allow reliable estimation of the first-stage regressions in equation 
(12). The issue of cell size will  be discussed in more detail below. About 
92 percent of the immigrants who entered the United States between 1960 
and 1979 originate in one of these 85 countries.I4 
I now use these data to examine some of  the questions raised by  the 
theory.I5  First, what is the correlation between the rate of wage growth and 
the log entry wage? Consider the convergence regression model: 
where 8Jk is  a fixed effect indicating if  the immigrant cohort arrived in 
calendar yearj  at age k; and q is a stochastic error. 
A number of technical details about the regression model in equation 
(15) are worth noting. First, the dependent variable may contain a great 
deal of sampling error. To account for the heteroscedasticity induced by 
this sampling error, I weigh  all regressions by  the factor  (n;l  + nt;’)-’, 
where n, is the sample size of the cell in census year t. Note that the same 
14. About 60 percent of the immigrants omitted from the sample did not report a country 
of origin. 
15. The grouped data can also be used to test whether there are cohort effects in the rate 
of wage growth. Consider a regression model that relates the rate of wage growth of immi- 
grants relative to that of comparably aged natives, A!&,  f),  to a vector of variables indicat- 
ing the time of migration, holding constant the age at migration. This regression reveals that 
during the first 10 years after migration, the immigrants who migrated in the early 1960s 
experience the same relative wage growth as those who migrated in the early 1970s; and that 
the immigrants who migrated in the late 1960s experience the same relative wage growth as 
those who migrated in the late 1970s. Thep-values for these tests are between .4  and .5. 30  George J. Borjas 
country appears a number of times in the sample and the stochastic error 
q might contain a country-specific component. The tables, therefore, re- 
port White-corrected standard errors that adjust for this sampling frame. 
Second, the fixed effect S,k  control for common factors that affect the 
rate of wage growth of immigrants who arrived at the same time and at 
the same age. The inclusion of  these fixed effects effectively implies that 
the regression coefficient 8 would be numerically identical if the dependent 
variable had been defined in terms of the rate of wage growth of immi- 
grants relative to that of comparably aged natives, or A$,&,  t’).  The reason 
is that the native rate of wage growth is constant within a particular age 
group. The regression results reported below, therefore, can be interpreted 
as analyzing the determinants of the rate of wage convergence between 
immigrants and natives. 
Finally, to ensure that the convergence regressions use the log entry 
wage as the independent variable, the analysis is restricted to the rate of 
wage growth observed during an immigrant cohort’s first 10 years in the 
United States. As a result, the cohorts that arrived in the 1960s contribute 
only one observation to the sample, giving the wage growth between 1970 
and 1980; and the cohorts that arrived in the 1970s also contribute one 
observation to the sample, giving the wage growth observed between 1980 
and 1990. Of course, the wage at time t (the beginning of the decade) is a 
much better approximation of the entry wage for the immigrants who ar- 
rived in the last half of the preceding decade. Consider, for example, the 
cohort that arrived between 1965 and 1970. Equation (15) then relates the 
rate of wage growth over the period  1970-80  to the 1970 log wage. The 
1970 wage, however, is not as good an approximation of the entry wage 
for the immigrants who arrived in the first half of the 1960s. I will show 
below that  this rough approximation  does not impart a serious bias on 
the analysis. 
Row 1 of table 1.4 reports the relevant coefficients from the convergence 
regressions. The simplest specification (reported in the first column) re- 
veals a positive,  though insignificant, correlation between the unadjusted 
rate of wage growth and the log entry wage of immigrant cohorts. This 
weak correlation is consistent with the raw data summarized in table 1.1: 
More  recent  cohorts,  who  have  much  lower  entry  wages,  experience 
roughly the same rate of wage growth as earlier cohorts. Therefore, there 
is little reason to expect that the earnings of immigrants who belong to 
different national origin groups and arrive at different times will converge 
as they assimilate in the United States. If we  take the positive point esti- 
mate of 8 at face value, the data, in fact, suggest that there might be some 
divergence over time: The immigrants with the highest entry wages are 
also the ones who experience the most rapid wage growth. In the context 
of the model, there seems to be some weak relative complementarity be- 
tween the skills that immigrants bring into the United States and the skills The Economic Progress of Immigrants  31 
Table 1.4  Estimates of Wage Convergence 
Regression 
1. Unadjusted rate of wage growth 
(N  = 819) 
Log entry wage 
Initial educational attainment 
R2 
growth (N  = 819) 
Log entry wage 
Initial educational attainment 
2. Education-adjusted rate of wage 
R' 
3. Unadjusted rate of wage growth: 
Cohorts with large numbers of 
observations (N  = 409) 
Log entry wage 
Initial educational attainment 
R2 
4. Unadjusted rate of wage growth: 
Cohorts in United States for 5 
years or less (N  = 414) 
Log entry wage 
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Note: Dependent variable is rate of wage growth observed in first 10 years in United States. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by  (nil + n;l)-', 
where no is the number of observations used in calculating the wage at the beginning of the 
decade, and n, is  the number  of observations used  in calculating the wage at the end of 
the decade. 
that they acquire in the postmigration period. This result resembles Min- 
cer's (1974) finding of complementarity between investments in school and 
investments in on-the-job training. 
As the remaining coefficients reported in row 1 of table 1.4 show, how- 
ever, a simple change in the specification of the regression turns the weak 32  George J. Borjas 
positive coefficient into a significant negative one. Consider the regression 
model that estimates the rate of cunditiund convergence: 
(14)  Ay,k(t9 l’)  =  O*  V,k(‘)  +  $  Y,k(‘) +  5,k  +  qzjk  9 
where Hyk(t)  gives the effective human capital of cohort (i, j,  k) at time t. 
The parameter 0* estimates the rate of conditional convergence, the rate 
at which the earnings of different immigrant cohorts converge ifwe  hold 
the initial human capital endowment of the cohorts constant. 
Although the census data do not offer precise measures of the cohort’s 
effective human capital at the time of entry, we have information on the 
average educational attainment of the cohort at time t. Table 1.4 reveals 
that the coefficient O*  is strongly negative when the regression adds the 
cohort’s educational attainment, and becomes even more negative if  the 
regression includes country-of-origin fixed effects (which can also be inter- 
preted  as determining  effective human capital). Holding initial  human 
capital constant, therefore, there is convergence among the various immi- 
grant groups. Moreover, the rate of convergence is economically signifi- 
cant. The regression coefficient of  -.39  suggests that  wage differences 
among the various immigrant groups (holding initial skills constant) nar- 
row by  32.2 percent within the first decade. If this rate of convergence re- 
mained constant over the immigrant’s working life, over two-thirds of the 
initial wage  differential would vanish within  30  years. This finding, of 
course, mirrors the well-known conditional convergence result in the eco- 
nomic growth literature (Barro 1997). 
The conditional convergence result is also related to the recent work of 
Duleep and Regets (1997a, 1997b), who use an alternative way of control- 
ling for education in the analysis. Duleep and Regets define the immigrant 
cohort not only in terms of country of origin, year of arrival, and age at 
migration (i.e., a cell in i,j,  k)  but also in terms of educational attainment 
(s).  In particular, let vy&)  be the log wage of an immigrant cohort originat- 
ing in country i, arriving in calendar yearj, migrating at age k, and with s 
years of  schooling. Similarly, let  Avyks(t,  t’) be the rate of wage growth 
experienced by  this cohort over the time interval (t, t’). To  simplify the 
exposition, suppose that all immigrant cohorts arrive in the same calendar 
yearj  and that the wage growth is observed over the same time interval 
(t,  t’).  Consider the regression model: 
where wikS  is an independent identically distributed (iid.)  error term. Du- 
leep and Regets (1997b) show that A is strongly negative, and they inter- 
pret this finding as implying that the decline in skills across successive 
immigrant cohorts is not as strong as suggested by  the trend in  entry 
wages. A negative A seems to suggest that more recent cohorts will experi- The Economic Progress of Immigrants  33 
ence faster wage growth in the future and that the present value of the 
age-earnings profile might not differ much across cohorts. 
The key  question, however, is whether the coefficient A  estimates the 
unconditional rate of convergence (8) or the conditional rate of conver- 
gence (8*). To see the relationship among the various parameters, rewrite 
the log entry wage and the rate of wage growth for the (i, k,  s)  cohort as 
(18)  vks =  vk +  'P,  +  erksy 
(19)  'Yks  =  'Yk  =  XY ' 
where 'p,  and x, are fixed effects giving the returns to schooling for the log 
entry wage and the rate of wage growth, respectively; and erks  and E,,  are 
i.i.d. random variables that are uncorrelated  with the other right-hand- 
side variables in equations (18) and (19). The convergence regression in 
equation (1  7) can be rewritten as 
(20)  Avlk  =  xvi,  + (A(p~  -  x,) + 5,  +  O', 
where o  = o,ks  + Aerkr -  E,,,  and an observation is an (i, k, s) cell. Let 
p,,(s) be the fraction of the population that has s years of schooling in the 
immigrant cohort that migrated from country i at age k, and aggregate 
across schooling groups within this cohort.I6  This aggregation yields 
(21)  "rk  =  "1,  +  ~('(PJ - x,)p,k(s>  +  5,  + '' 
S 
Equation (2 1)  shows that the convergence regression that uses schooling 
groups to define the cohort is equivalent to a regression that aggregates 
across schooling groups but includes variables that indicate the educa- 
tional attainment of the cohort. As a result, the coefficient A estimates the 
extent of conditional convergence across immigrant cohorts, 8*. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that Duleep and Regets (1997b) find a great deal of 
wage convergence across immigrant cohorts since they are implicitly hold- 
ing constant the human capital endowment at the time of entry. 
Row 2 of table 1.4 shows a related way of controlling for educational at- 
tainment. The regressions in this panel use earnings data that are adjusted 
for education in the first stage. In particular, the individual-level regressions 
in equation (12) include educational attainment as an independent variable. 
As a result, the log entry wage (vJ  and the rate of wage growth (Av,) 
are measured for the worker with the "average"  level of schooling. This 
approach to controlling for differences in education attainment across the 
groups, therefore, is roughly similar to the Duleep-Regets approach. Not 
surprisingly, the regression coefficients reported in row 2 of table 1.4 show 
that the correlation between the rate of wage growth and the log entry 
16. The aggregation uses p,&)  as weights. 34  George J. Borjas 
wage is strongly negative, regardless of the variables that are included in 
the regression. 
Although interesting, it is important not to over interpret the practical 
significance of the finding of conditional convergence. Conditional con- 
vergence does not suggest that immigrant cohorts with lower entry wages 
experience faster wage growth in the United  States. There is,  in fact, no 
convergence among the various national origin groups that make up the 
immigrant population. The observed wage gap among the various immi- 
grant cohorts will not narrow over time, but might even increase. 
The lesson is clear: The choice of a base group is crucial in any discus- 
sion of  immigrant economic progress or assimilation.  Immigrants who 
start out with similar endowments of human capital tend to end up with 
roughly similar wages. But immigrants originating in different countries, 
in fact, have very different human capital endowments and will tend to 
end up in very different places in the income distribution. 
There are a number of technical problems with the convergence regres- 
sions reported in table  1.4 that dcscrve some discussion. First, many  of 
the cells in the analysis contain relatively few observations. The dependent 
variable in each cell is constructed from wages reported in two different 
censuses. Because the 1980 and 1990 immigrant extracts form a 5 percent 
random sample of the population (and because the immigrant population 
has grown rapidly over time), the sample size used in the construction of 
wage levels for the various  cells is  reasonable  for most  national  origin 
groups. In particular, 19 observations were used to calculate the 1980 wage 
for the average cohort, and 24 observations were used to calculate the 1990 
wage. The smaller size of the  1970 immigrant extract, however, implies 
that only 11 observations were used to calculate the 1970 wage for the av- 
erage cohort." 
As noted earlier, all the regressions  are weighted by the factor (n;'  + 
n;')-'.  I reestimated the regression  models using only the cells that are 
likely to have the least sampling error. In particular, I restricted the analy- 
sis to the 50 percent of the cells that have the largest value of the weights. 
As shown in table 1.4, there is even stronger evidence of a positive correla- 
17. These averages hide a lot of dispersion in sample size among cells. In calculating the 
1980 wage for the 1980-1990  wage growth measure. 25 percent of the cells have 9 or fewer 
observations, 50 percent have more than 24 observations, and 25 percent have more than 72 
observations. In calculating the 1990 wage for the 1980-1990 wage growth measure, 25 per- 
cent of the cells have 7 or fewer observations, 50 percent have more than 19 observations, 
and 25 percent have more than 55 observations. In calculating the 1970 wage for the 1970- 
1980 wage growth measure, 25 percent of the cells have 5 or fewer observations, SO percent 
have more than 11 observations, and 25 percent have more than 30 observations. In calculat- 
ing the 1980 wage for the 1970-1980 wage growth measure, 2.5  percent of the cells have 9 or 
fewer observations, 50 percent have more than 24 observations and 25 percent have more 
than 71 observations. The Economic Progress of Immigrants  35 
tion between entry wage levels and the unadjusted wage growth in  this 
restricted sample. And as before, the positive convergence coefficient turns 
negative when the regressions control for either educational attainment or 
country of origin.I8 
A second potential problem is that the log entry wage measures different 
things for different cohorts. As noted  above, the wage  observed at  the 
beginning of the decade (time t)  is roughly the entry wage for those immi- 
grants who arrived during the 1965-69  or 1975-79  periods. This wage, 
however, is not the entry wage for immigrants who arrived in either the 
first half of the  1960s or the first half of the 1970s. Row  4 of table 1.4 
shows that the results do not change when the regressions are restricted 
to the immigrant cohorts that  migrated in the last half of a particular 
decade. The correlation between the log entry wage and the rate of  wage 
growth is  positive when no controls are included in the regression, and 
turns negative when human capital controls are added. 
Finally, there is probably measurement error in the log entry wage. Any 
measurement error in this wage will impart a negative bias on its coeffi- 
cient (toward -  1). The spurious negative correlation  arises because the 
log entry wage appears on both sides of the equation, but with different 
signs. One can assess the sensitivity of the results to measurement error 
by using instrumental variables to eliminate the spurious correlation. 
The construction  of  the census data suggests two alternative instru- 
ments for the log entry wage. The regressions reported in row  1 of table 
1.4 use the rate of wage growth observed for the immigrant cohorts that 
arrived in 1960-64,  1965-69,  1970-74, or 1975-79.  To eliminate the mea- 
surement error, we  can use the log entry wage of the preceding immigrant 
cohort as an instrument for the entry wage of a particular cohort. Con- 
sider, for example, the Mexican immigrants who were 25-34  years old in 
1980 and who entered the United States between 1975 and 1979. The pro- 
posed instrument would be the wage of  Mexican immigrants who were 
25-34  in 1980 but who entered the country between 1970 and 1974.19  The 
18. To assess the sensitivity of the results to sample size and outlying observations, I esti- 
mated a set of unweighted convergence regressions in the sample of immigrant cohorts where 
I used at least 30 observations to calculate the mean wage of the cohort. The basic conver- 
gence coefficient is -.065 with a standard error of .05, so that there is essentially no relation- 
ship between the rate of wage growth and the log entry wage. The basic conditional con- 
vergence coefficient is  -.313,  with a  standard  error  of  .06. These regressions have  270 
observations. The unweighted results, therefore, are roughly similar to those reported in the 
text. I also estimated the regressions after omitting the immigrant cohorts that originated in 
Mexico. The unconditional convergence coefficient in the subsample of cohorts where I used 
more than 30 observations to calculate the mean wage of the cohort in each census year and 
where the Mexican cohorts are omitted is -.097,  with a standard error of .05. The respective 
conditional convergence coefficient is -.305,  with a standard error of .06. These regressions 
have 258 observations. 
19. The R2 for the first-stage regression is .68. 36  George J.  Borjas 
Table 1.5  Estimates of Wage Convergence, Using Instrumental Variables 
1. Cohorts who migrated between 
1965 and 1980a 
Log entry wage 
Initial educational attainment 
2. Cohorts who migrated between 
1960 and 1969b 
Log wage in 1980 
Educational attainment in 1980 
,1686  -.3535 
(.1091)  (.0786) 
-  ,0442 
(.0066) 
,1523  -.1284 
(.0959)  (.0970) 
~  ,0248 
(.0100) 
,3371  ,0146 
(.0918)  (.0862) 
~  ,0261 
(.0055) 
,2525  ,2018 
(.0884)  (.1296) 
-  ,0045 
(.0094) 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a vector of fixed 
effects indicating the cohort's year of migrationlage at arrival. The regressions are weighted 
by  (n;'  + n;')-I, where no  is the number of observations used in calculating the wage at the 
beginning of the decade, and n,  is the number of observations used in calculating the wage 
at the end of the decade. 
"Dependent variable is rate of wage growth during first 10 years; instrument is log entry wage 
for preceding cohort. N = 402. 
bDependent variable is rate of wage growth between 1980 and 1990; instrument is log entry 
wage of cohort in 1970. N = 235. 
construction  of this instrument,  of course, implies that  the immigrants 
who arrived between  1960 and 1964 do not contribute any observations 
to the regression (since no preceding cohort is observed for this group). 
Row 1 of table  1.5 reports both the ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
instrumental variables (IV) convergence coefficients in this subsample of 
the data. The OLS coefficients resemble those reported earlier: There is a 
positive correlation  between  the  log  entry  wage  and the rate  of wage 
growth in the raw data, and this correlation turns negative once the regres- 
sion controls for educational attainment.  The IV procedure  leads to a 
much  stronger positive correlation between  the log entry wage and the 
subsequent rate of wage growth when the regression does not control for 
initial educational attainment, and it greatly weakens the negative correla- 
tion (in fact, it is essentially zero) when the education control is added. 
The IV estimation, therefore, raises questions about the robustness of the 
finding of conditional convergence. 
These doubts are reinforced when we use an alternative instrument. We 
have three measures of the wage for the immigrants who arrived between 
1960 and 1970. For these immigrants, we can observe their wage in 1970, 
1980, and 1990. We can use this subsample of immigrants to estimate a The Economic Progress of Immigrants  37 
convergence coefficient by regressing the 1980-90  rate of wage growth on 
the 1980 log wage. The data, however, also allow us to instrument the 1980 
wage by the group’s 1970 wage.2o  The resulting OLS and IV estimates are 
reported in row 2 of table 1.5. The IV results show that the correlation be- 
tween wage levels and wage growth remains positive even after we control 
for educational attainment. 
In sum, there is a positive (although weak) correlation between the log 
entry wage and the subsequent rate of wage growth across immigrant co- 
horts. If anything, immigrants who earn high wages at the time of entry 
experience faster wage growth in the future. This correlation, however, 
turns negative when the analysis adjusts for differences in initial endow- 
ments of human capital, either by including measures of educational at- 
tainment or country-of-origin fixed effects. The results, therefore, seem to 
suggest that there exists conditional convergence in the immigrant popula- 
tion, in the sense that the wages of immigrant groups that have the same 
initial level of human capital converge over time. However, this finding is 
not robust to simple attempts to control for the bias introduced by mea- 
surement error. 
1.5  Immigrant Economic Progress and Source Country Characteristics 
As we  have seen, there are huge differences in log entry wages across 
national origin groups. Many studies have found that the initial economic 
performance of immigrants in the United States is strongly correlated with 
source country characteristics.  For example, Borjas (1987) reports that 
immigrant wages depend positively on the per capita GDP of the source 
country and negatively on measures of income inequality, Similarly, Jasso 
and Rosenzweig (1986) report a positive correlation between immigrant 
wages and a variable indicating if the country of origin receives a Voice of 
America broadcast (presumably because these broadcasts provide infor- 
mation about the United States). 
Suppose we  interpret  some of  the source  country  characteristics  as 
rough measures of the effective human capital of immigrant cohorts. The 
human capital model presented earlier then predicts that the qualitative 
effects of the source country characteristics on the log entry wage and on 
the rate of wage growth depend on the extent of relative complementarity 
or substitutability in the production function. The convergence regressions 
suggest that the production function exhibits weak relative complementar- 
ity between pre-existing human capital and postmigration investments. We 
would then expect that the source country variables have the same qualita- 
tive impact on the log entry wage and on the rate of wage growth. To 
20. The R2 for the first-stage regression is .73. 38  George J. Borjas 
examine this theoretical implication, I constructed a data set summarizing 
various  economic  characteristics  for  75  source  countries.*’ The  source 
country characteristics are as follows: 
1. Per capita GDP in the source country. I used the Penn World Tables 
(version 5.6) to obtain a measure of per capita GDP in 1960, 1965, 1970, 
and 1975.’’  These dates were chosen to correspond with the time at which 
each of the four year-of-migration cohorts left the source country. Immi- 
grants from richer countries tend to earn more in the United States-even 
after controlling  for educational attainment  and other  observable  mea- 
sures of a worker’s skills. Presumably, this correlation arises because the 
skills acquired in industrialized economies are more easily transferable to 
the United States. If increases in per capita GDP  raise the effective human 
capital that immigrants  bring to the United  States and if  there is weak 
relative complementarity in the human capital production function, the 
theory predicts that immigrants originating in richer countries should also 
have higher rates of wage growth. 
2.  The Gini coeficient of the source country’s income distribution. Borjas 
(1  987) has argued that  immigrants  originating  in countries that  offer a 
high rate of return to skills are more likely to be negatively selected, will 
have a smaller effective human capital stock at the time of migration, and 
will earn less in the United States. A higher rate of return to skills implies 
a more disperse distribution of income. The Gini coefficient of the source 
country’s income distribution should then have a negative impact on the 
rate of wage growth. Deininger and Squire (1996) have constructed vari- 
ous measures of income inequality, including the Gini coefficient, for most 
countries since 1960. I used these data to obtain measures of the Gini co- 
efficients in four years: 1960, 1965, 1970, and 1975.23 
3.  A measure of “openness” of the source country’s economy. The open- 
ness index is defined as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (in per- 
centage terms).  I used  the Penn World Tables to get this index for the 
calendar years 1960,1965,1970, and 1975. Immigrants originating in coun- 
tries with open economies are more likely to have some contact with for- 
21. The 75 countries included in the data below contain about 89 percent of all immigrants 
enumerated in the census who arrived between 1960 and 1979. A list of the 75 countries in 
the data is presented in the appendix. 
22. The variable used is the real GDP per capita (Laspeyres index) in 1985 international 
prices. 
23. The Gini coefficients are not available for all countries in all the years required. For 
some countries, for example, there are only two data points over the 1960-1980 period, once 
in the 1960s and once in the 1970s. In such cases, I used the data point for the 1960s and 
applied it to both 1960 and 1965, and the data point for the  1970s and applied it to both 
1970 and 1975. I did not use any type of linear interpolation in the study, but simply approxi- 
mated the dates available in the data to the dates required for my analysis. I also reestimated 
the regressions in the subsample of countries where such approximations were not required 
and obtained very similar results. The Economic Progress of Immigrants  39 
eign industries and economic institutions prior  to migration,  are more 
likely to have the types of skills that other countries value, and would be 
expected to have a higher level of effective capital when they enter the 
United States. Weak relative complementarity in the production function 
implies that the openness index should be positively correlated with both 
the log entry wage and the rate of wage growth of immigrant cohorts. 
4.  A  Herjndahl index measuring  how  immigrant  cohorts cluster  geo- 
graphically once they enter the  United States. It has long been suspected 
(without much evidence) that residential clustering affects economic op- 
portunities. Define the Herfindahl index for the group of immigrants who 
arrived from country i in year j as 
where Ei,  gives the fraction of immigrants from the (i,  j)  cell who live in 
state r. The Herfindahl index takes on a maximum value of one if all immi- 
grants live in a single state, and it becomes smaller the more randomly the 
immigrants are distributed over the United  States. I  use data on states, 
rather than on metropolitan areas, to calculate the clustering index. The 
Herfindahl index is sensitive to the number of geographic units, and the 
number of metropolitan areas identified by the census has grown signifi- 
cantly over time (particularly  between  1970 and  1980). The state-based 
calculation, therefore, makes the Herfindahl index comparable over time. 
The measures of the Herfindahl index for the immigrant cohorts that ar- 
rived in  either  1960-64  or 1965-69  are obtained from the 1970 census, 
while the measures of the index for the cohorts that arrived in 1970-74  or 
1975-79  are obtained from the 1980 census. 
5.  The distance from the country of  origin to the United Stutes (in thou- 
sands of  miles).24  Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) have shown that the re- 
turn migration rate of immigrants in the United States is negatively corre- 
lated with distance from the source country. This empirical finding sug- 
gests that immigrants who originate in far-away countries are more likely to 
view their migration to the United States as permanent, and have greater 
incentives to invest in  U.S.-specific capital. In terms of the theoretical 
framework, longer distances decrease the probability of out-migration and 
increase  the  discounting  factor  p.  Distance  from  the  source  country, 
therefore, should have a positive effect on the rate of wage growth.** 
6.  Political conditions in the country of  origin. Barro and Lee (1994) used 
the Banks (1 986) Cross-National Time-Series Data File to calculate the 
number of revolutions (per year) that occurred in the various countries in 
24. These data are obtained from Fitzpatrick and Madlin (1986). 
25. Borjas (1987) shows that distance from the source country (which presumably affects 
migration costs) can also have a direct effect on effective human capital because it influences 
the selection of the immigrant flow. 40  George J. Borjas 
Table 1.6  Log Wage Level and Source Country Characteristics 
Regression 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Log per capita GDP  ,0862  ,1361  ,1285  ,0531 
(.0299)  (.0222)  (.0928)  (.0707) 
Openness index  .0013  -.0001  -.0010  -  ,0004 
(.0006)  (.0006)  (.0008)  (.0006) 
Gini coeficient  ~  ,0047  -.0012  -  ,0070  -.0019 
(.OO 15)  (.0015)  (.0057)  (.0040) 
Herfindahl index  -.8331  -.3133  -.0639  .I580 
(.1552)  (.1514)  (.1497)  (.1465) 
(.O 103)  (.0081) 
Revolutions per year  ,0108  -.0105  .0201  -  ,0062 
(.0493)  (.039  1)  (.0555)  (.03  18) 
Initial educational attainment  ,0495  -  .0675 
(.0092)  (.0091) 
R’  ,770  .845  ,879  ,906 
Includes country-of-origin 
fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
~  Distance (in 1,000s of miles)  .0163  .0018  - 
~ 
Note: Sample comprises immigrant cohorts who have been in United States 10 or fewer 
years. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a vector of dummy 
variables indicating the cohort’s age at arrival and year of migration. The regressions have 
966 observations. The regressions are weighted by  the number of observations used in calcu- 
lating the mean log wage. 
the periods 1960-64,  1965-69,  1970-74, and 1975-79.  Political instability 
in the country of origin would likely have an impact on the return rnigra- 
tion rate, and should again affect the discounting factor. A higher degree 
of political instability, therefore, would presumably lead to higher rates of 
wage growth in the United States. 
It is useful to begin by documenting that the source country characteris- 
tics have effects on the log entry wage that are consistent with those re- 
ported in the existing literature. The log entry wage is defined by the fixed 
effect vVk(f) calculated in equation (12); it is obtained from the 1970 census 
for the cohorts that arrived in the 1960s, and from the 1980 census for the 
cohorts that arrived in the 1970s. The main specification of the log wage 
regressions is reported in the first column of table  1.6.2h  In general, the 
results are consistent with the evidence reported in existing studies. Immi- 
grants who originate in richer countries earn more, and immigrants who 
originate in countries with high levels of income inequality earn less. The 
regression  also reveals that  immigrants originating in  open economies 
earn more, and that the immigrant groups who exhibit substantial geo- 
26. The regressions are weighted by  the cell size. The Economic Progress of Immigrants  41 
graphic clustering earn less. The remaining columns of table 1.6 show that 
the inclusion of educational attainment or of country-of-origin fixed ef- 
fects weaken many of the coefficients. 
The first column of table  1.7 reports the main regression showing the 
relationship between the rate of wage growth and the source country char- 
acteristics. With one important exception, variables that presumably in- 
crease the cohort’s effective human capital tend to have a positive impact 
on the rate of wage growth, suggesting weak relative complementarity in 
the human capital production function. Consider, for example, the index 
of openness in the source country. Immigrants originating in open econo- 
mies both earn more and experience faster wage growth. Moreover, the 
effect is numerically important: A change in the index from 31 to 80, which 
are the 1975 openness indices for Spain and Jamaica respectively, implies 
a 7 percentage point increase in the rate of wage growth. 
The regressions also indicate that immigrants originating in countries 
with higher Gini coefficients experience slower wage growth. And again, 
the  effect  is  numerically  important. In  1975, the  Gini  coefficient for 
Czechoslovakia was 21, while for Mexico it was 58. This difference in the 
Gini coefficient implies a  14 percentage point differential in the rate of 
wage growth. 
Table 1.7 also shows that the distance between the source country and 
the United States, a measure of the difficulty of  return migration, has a 
significant positive effect on the rate of wage growth. Immigrants who 
originate in a country that is 5,500 miles away will, on average, experience 
about 6 percentage points greater wage growth than immigrants who come 
from a country that is  500 miles away. The regression, however, shows 
that the political instability variable does not play a significant role in de- 
termining the rate of wage growth. 
The regression also suggests that immigrant clustering reduces the rate 
of wage growth. The estimated coefficient of the Herfindahl index suggests 
that a reduction in this index from .25 to .04 (or roughly from the average 
Herfindahl index in the immigrant population to that found among na- 
tives) would increase the rate of wage growth by about 3 percentage points. 
Of course, the regressions do not tell us why this correlation arises. The 
clustering of immigrants, for instance, may have a direct impact on their 
economic opportunities simply because the increase in labor supply re- 
duces wages (particularly if immigrants are immobile). Residential segre- 
gation, however, may also change the immigrant’s effective human capital 
by reducing the incentives to invest in English language proficiency, or by 
“tying” the immigrants to specific regions of the country. It would be of 
great interest to determine the channels through which immigrant cluster- 
ing slows down the rate of economic progress. 
The one anomaly in the regression is the impact of per capita GDP in 
the source country. This variable has a strong positive effect on the log Table 1.7  Rate of Wage Growth and Source Country Characteristics 
Regression 
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entry wage, but a strong negative effect on the rate of wage growth. The 
negative correlation reported in the first column of table  1.7, however, 
turns out to be very sensitive to model specification. Consider, for ex- 
ample, the regressions reported in columns (3) and (4),  which add a vector 
of country-of-origin fixed effects to the specification. Most of the source 
country variables have the same impact as in the simpler regression, so 
that a decrease in income inequality within the country raises the rate of 
wage growth of  immigrants in the United  States. The coefficient of per 
capita GDP, however, becomes insignificant. 
Finally, it  is  worth  noting  that  the  source country characteristics- 
which, at best, are rough measures of the effective human capital stock 
of a particular cohort of immigrants-explain  about 60 percent of  the 
dispersion  in wage growth among the various cohorts. In other words, 
source country characteristics matter a great deal in determining the rate 
of wage growth of immigrants in the United States. 
The regression specifications reported  in columns (3) and (4) of table 
1.7 include the average educational attainment of the immigrants at the 
time of entry. Column (3) implies that a one-year increase in educational 
attainment increases the rate of wage growth by  1.2 percentage points. 
Note, however, that the independent impact of educational attainment dis- 
appears when the regression includes a vector of country-of-origin fixed 
effects. 
It would be of interest to include measures of English language profi- 
ciency in the wage growth regressions. Presumably, persons who know the 
language would have an easier time adapting in the United  States (al- 
though  this effect could  be  attenuated by  residential  segregation). The 
1970 U.S. census, however, does not contain any information on English 
language proficiency, so we cannot observe the initial language skills of 
the immigrants who arrived in the 1960s. I used the 1980 census to calcu- 
late the probability that immigrants who arrived between  1975 and 1979 
spoke English well or very well. This statistic was calculated for each co- 
hort by country of origin and age at arrival. The last two columns of table 
1.7 report the regression results obtained when one includes this variable 
in the model (and when the regression is estimated in the subsample of 
immigrants who migrated in 1975-79).  English language proficiency at the 
time of entry has an independent positive impact on the rate  of wage 
growth, but it does not change the impact of most of the other variables 
in the model. The last column in the table shows that the impact of English 
language proficiency becomes insignificant if  we  control for the educa- 
tional attainment of the cohort. 
In sum, the empirical evidence shows that source country characteristics 
matter in  determining both the entry wage and the subsequent rate of 
wage growth. Moreover, the same underlying factors that tend to generate 
higher wages also tend to generate faster wage growth. In effect, the empir- 44  George J. Borjas 
ical results confirm that there is a positive correlation  between the eco- 
nomic performance of immigrants  at the time  of entry and the rate of 
economic progress in the United States, so that the human capital produc- 
tion function for immigrants exhibits weak relative complementarity. 
1.6  Investments in Education 
The previous section documented that the rate of wage growth experi- 
enced by immigrants cohorts responded to source country characteristics 
that proxy for either the effective rate of human capital or the discounting 
factor. This section shows more directly that source country characteris- 
tics do indeed alter the rate of human capital accumulation by examining 
the determinants  of investments in educational attainment  in the post- 
migration period. 
I computed the change in educational attainment experienced by each 
of the immigrant cohorts (by country of origin, year of arrival, and age 
at migration) during their first 10 years in the United States. I then esti- 
mated regressions, identical to those presented in earlier sections, that de- 
scribe both the extent  of convergence  in educational attainment  across 
immigrant  cohorts and the link  between  investments in  schooling and 
source country characteristics. The estimated regressions are reported in 
table 1.8.27 
The first two columns of the table report the simple convergence regres- 
sions by relating the change in educational attainment during the first 10 
years to the educational attainment at the time of entry. As with the anal- 
ysis of wage convergence, the raw correlation is positive, but weak. If the 
regression  also includes a vector of country-of-origin  fixed effects, how- 
ever, these correlations become negative and significant. Not surprisingly, 
immigrants  who  originate  in  the same country  of  origin  (but arrive at 
different times and at different ages) tend to converge to the same educa- 
tional attainment. Nevertheless,  the main implication  of the evidence is 
that immigrants who have the highest level of effective human capital at 
the time of entry are also the ones who make the largest postmigration 
investments, and hence experience the fastest rate of economic progress. 
Once again, the empirical evidence suggests some complementarity be- 
tween pre-existing human capital and the rate of human capital accumula- 
tion in the United States. 
The remaining columns of the table report regressions of the change in 
educational attainment on the source country characteristics. For the most 
27. Not surprisingly, there is  a strong positive link between  v,,,J,  if),  the wage change 
experienced by  a particular cohort during the time interval (f,  f’),  and the cohort’s change 
in educational  attainment. The coefficient  from a  regression  of the wage change on the 
change in educational attainment in the sample of cohorts used in table 1.8 is ,070 (with a 
standard error of .018), and the R2  is ,402. Table 1.8  Determinants of Postmigration Investments in  Education 
Regression 
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Note; Dependent variable is change in educational attainment of immigrant cohort in first 10 years after arrival. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
All regressions include a vector of dummy variables indicating the cohort’s age at arrival and year of migration. The regressions in the first two columns 
have 819 observations, and the regressions in the remaining columns have 749 observations. The regressions are weighted by  (n;’ + n;’)-’,  where no is the 
number of observations used in calculating the education level at the beginning of the decade, and n,  is the number of observations used in calculating the 
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part, the regressions confirm the results reported in the previous section. 
The source country characteristics tend to affect investments in education 
in the same way that they affect the rate of wage growth. Immigrants who 
originate in countries where the income distribution has a large Gini co- 
efficient (and presumably there is a large rate of return to skills) acquire 
less schooling in the postmigration period; immigrants who originate in 
open economies acquire more schooling; and immigrants who originate 
in richer countries acquire less schooling (but this anomalous correlation 
is not significant). 
1.7  Summary 
This paper presented a theoretical and empirical study of the determi- 
nants of economic progress in the immigrant population. The theoretical 
framework used the human capital model to derive the relationship be- 
tween the human capital endowment of immigrants at the time they enter 
the United States, the entry wage of the immigrant cohort, and the subse- 
quent rate of wage growth. The theory showed that the correlation be- 
tween initial (log) wages and the rate of wage growth could be positive if 
there existed some complementarity in the production function for human 
capital, so that highly skilled immigrants would find it easier to acquire 
additional human capital in the United States. The potential existence of 
relative complementarity has practical significance: The sizable skill dif- 
ferentials that are observed among immigrant groups at the time of entry 
could well widen over time. 
The empirical analysis used the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Public Use Micro- 
data Samples of the U.S. census. These data permit the tracking of specific 
cohorts of immigrants over a 20-year time frame. The immigrant cohorts 
were defined in terms of national origin, year of migration, and age at 
arrival. The study generated a number of findings: 
1. There is a weak positive correlation between the log entry wage and 
the rate of wage growth, suggesting some complementarity between the 
human capital acquired abroad and the human capital that immigrants 
acquire in the United States. This positive correlation, however, probably 
turns negative if we compare immigrants who have similar human capital 
endowments when they enter the United States. 
2.  There is no evidence that more recent immigrant cohorts, who have 
lower entry wages, experience faster wage growth. 
3.  Because of the relative weak complementarity in the human capital 
production function, the same source country characteristics that improve 
the economic status of immigrants at the time of entry also lead to larger 
human capital acquisition in the postmigration period  and faster wage 
growth. The Economic Progress of Immigrants  47 
The long-run economic performance of immigrants in the United States 
plays an important role in any assessment of the economic impact of im- 
migration. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that 
immigrants who enter the United States with a sizable human capital en- 
dowment are also the immigrants who find it easier to adapt and acquire 
additional skills in their new surroundings. As a result, the process of eco- 
nomic assimilation does not “even out” the playing field in the immigrant 
population.  Instead,  the assimilation process may  actually increase in- 
come inequality among national  origin groups in the immigrant popu- 
lation. 
Appendix 
Countries Usei  in  the Analysis 
Note: The countries marked with an asterisk are not included in the analy- 
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France  Poland  USSR 
Germany  Portugal  Yugoslavia 
Greece  Romania 
Hungary  Spain  Other 
Ireland  Sweden  Australia 
Italy  Switzerland  Fiji 
Netherlands  United Kingdom  New Zealand 
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